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Abstract 
Social capital is considered to be crucial for democratic politics. Its benevolent consequences can be 
attributed to two substantively different modes of social capital. Understood as an individual property the 
impact of social capital will be mainly restricted to those who command these resources. A much less 
researched approach depicts social capital as a collective good; that is, as a property of distinct societies 
whose impact everybody will feel. The main question of this study is: How do these individual and 
collective modes of social capital influence democratic citizenship in Western democracies? Multilevel 
modeling is used to test the impact of the two distinct modes of social capital as well as their interactions 
using survey data for 28 democracies extended with indicators for collective social capital. The analyses 
show that living in a country rich on social capital contributes to democratic citizenship beyond the 
positive effects of individual social capital. Moreover, especially environments richer on collective social 
capital activate citizens with high levels of individual social capital more to be politically active than less 
equipped environments. Apparently, those who are already privileged in terms of individual social capital 
will profit most from a social capital rich environment.  
 
Keywords: social capital, citizenship, political participation, political attitudes, democracy 
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Introduction: Making Democracy Work?  
In the last two decades the concept “social capital” has been introduced as a remedy for a number of social 
problems, and as the only feasible way to combine the claims and expectations of an emancipated and 
individualized citizenry with the requirements of democratic decision-making processes. These assertions 
are not characterized by modesty: “... social capital makes us smarter, healthier, safer, richer, and better 
able to govern a just and stable democracy” (Putnam, 2000, p. 290). This conclusion can be based on two 
substantively distinct understandings of social capital as an individual property or as a collective good. 
Although political scientists have conceptualized social capital frequently as a collective phenomenon, 
(cf. Stolle and Rochon, 1998; Newton, 2001; van Deth, 2001; van Deth, 2003) it has not been examined 
to a greater extent. The goal of this study is to examine how social capital as a collective good affects 
democratic citizenship of individual citizens and to show how it is related to effects of social capital as an 
individual property. In other words, the crucial question to wit is “… whose capital is at issue: that of the 
individual or the community?” (Inkeles, 2000, p. 247, emphasis original). Specifically, we ask: How do 
distinct modes of individual and collective social capital affect individual democratic citizenship (political 
engagement and evaluation of politics) in Western democracies?  
 In order to disentangle the political consequences of different levels of social capital we will, 
firstly, differentiate between individual and collective conceptualizations of social capital and develop 
various theoretical mechanisms presumed to influence democratic citizenship. While individual social 
capital increases democratic citizenship only for those people who possess individual social capital, 
collective social capital should motivate all citizens to “make democracy work” (Putnam, 1993). 
Collective social capital – providing a stimulating social and cultural environment – decreases transaction 
costs of collective engagement for everybody beyond her personal levels of social capital and other 
resources, and puts social pressure on individual citizens to comply with conventional ideas about 
“decent” behavior. Moreover, the two modes of social capital can interact in their effect on individual 
attitudes and behavior. Our analyses, therefore, will pay attention to the combined impacts of various 
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levels of individual and collective social capital in order to trace possible compensational or amplifying 
effects in Western democracies. 
We test the effects of different modes of social capital on democratic citizenship with multilevel 
regression-models using the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP 2004) data from 37,366 
individuals living in 28 democracies supplemented with country-level indicators. The results clearly 
support the need to distinguish between individual and collective social capital because both have 
independent positive effects on democratic citizenship. Besides, they also positively interact with each 
other: those who are already privileged in terms of individual social capital will profit most from a social 
capital rich environment.  
 
Social Capital  
The term social capital is used to refer to “... features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and 
networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (Putnam, 1993, 
p. 167). Most authors define two crucial dimensions of social capital: cultural aspects, which include 
mainly trust and confidence, and structural aspects, which cover mainly activities in institutionalized 
networks such as voluntary associations (cf. Coleman, 1990; Esser, 2008).   
Modes of social capital can be distinguished by specifying its locus as an individual property or 
as a collective good (Esser, 2008).1 Social capital conceived as a property of individuals draws mainly on 
sociological understandings of the concept (Bourdieu, Coleman, Lin), which locate social capital in social 
relations and networks between individuals or their groups (van Deth, 2003; Stolle, 2007; Edwards, 2009). 
On the other hand, social capital can be understood as a collective good, by definition available to each 
citizen (cf. Stolle and Rochon, 2002; Newton, 2001; van Deth, 2001; van Deth, 2003). As Newton remarks 
(2001, p. 207): “... if social capital is anything, it is a societal not an individual property, and should be 
studied as a social or collective phenomenon, not at the individual level as if it were a property of isolated 
citizens.” Distinguishing the two modes of social capital is highly relevant, firstly, because different 
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people are affected in different ways by the distributions of individual and collective social capital. 
Secondly, whereas each citizen can invest in individual social capital “… by means of ‘individual’ 
actions” one cannot invest individually in collective social capital “… because that is a case of ‘collective’ 
action” (Esser, 2008, p. 47).  
Studies of the impact of social capital on citizen politics usually focus on individual-level 
mechanisms: socially active citizens will be more trusting and consequently will be more supportive of 
democracy and more willing to be politically engaged (cf. Norris, 2002; van Deth, 2000; Paxton 2002; 
Freitag, 2003; Mouw, 2006; Bäck and Kestiliä, 2009; Stolle and Harell, 2013). Furthermore, various 
studies show cross-sectional relationships on the regional or national level between social capital and 
voter turnout and other modes of political participation (Putnam, 1999; van Deth, 2001; Paxton 2002; 
Benson and Rochon, 2004). Aside from a few exceptions (Letki, 2006; Whiteley et al., 2010; Meulemann, 
2008) these studies do not analyze collective social capital as a context for individual behavior and 
attitudes, but focus on its effects on aggregate characteristics. Even less attention has been paid to the 
consequences of the interaction between the availability of social capital as a collective good and the 
individual equipment of social capital (but see van Deth, 2002). What is lacking, then, is an integrated 
approach empirically examining the distinct impacts of individual and collective modes of social capital 
and examining the effects of individual social capital under distinct levels of collective social capital.  
Furthermore, most studies testing social capital theories usually examine the effect of social 
capital only on one type of outcome, i.e. they study either political trust, voting etc. However, the 
importance of social capital approaches lies in the fact that it covers not some specific orientation or type 
of behaviour but that it claims to explain the functioning of democracy in more general terms. In the realm 
of citizen politics, social capital is presumed to be crucial for citizenship and it should result – rather 
indiscriminately – in higher levels of political interest, political trust, support for democracy, and political 
participation (Putnam, 1995).  Hence, in order to provide a more robust test of this approach, we examine 
a range of observable implications of the theory. Specifically, we focus on the concept ‘democratic 
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citizenship’ which is widely used in political, social and academic debates about democracy. For example 
the Coucil of Europe defines it as the capabilities of citizens  „… to exercise and defend their democratic 
rights and responsibilities in society, to value diversity and to play an active part in democratic life“ 
(http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/education/edc/Charter/Charter_EN.asp; cf. Conover et al., 1991; Janoski 1998; 
Schudson 1998; van Deth 2007). Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry (1996) speak of democratic citizenship as 
‘enlightened political engagement’ composed of two dimensions: “… those qualities of citizenship that 
encourage understanding of and adherence to norms and principles of democracy” and “… behaviors and 
cognitions that enable citizens to pursue and protect self-interest in politics” (1996, p. 5-6). Our empirical 
tests will hence focus on individual aspects of democratic citizenship covering both political evaluations 
and political engagement.  
 
Individual Social Capital  
A first set of expectations about the impact of social capital on democratic citizenship is based on the 
conceptualization of social capital as an individual property (Lancee, 2010; van der Gaag and Snijders, 
2004). As indicated above, the two main aspects of each mode of social capital are social relationships 
(especially involvement in voluntary associations) and pro-social norms (especially trust). According to 
neo-Tocquevillean approaches re-occurring social contacts – as offered especially in voluntary 
associations – bring people in touch with each other on a regular basis. Although these opportunities are 
certainly not equally available in every association, the aims, goals or character of associations are largely 
irrelevant according to the theory. Instead, institutionalized aspects of associations are of crucial 
importance: contacts offered on a regular basis enable continuous learning processes and the development 
of trust and norms of reciprocity. In this way, networks provided by associations are different from social 
contacts with relatives, friends or neighbors, which usually do not offer institutionalized contacts. As a 
consequence, people active in associations will develop skills and competences to collaborate as well as 
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mutual trust and pro-social norms – which will motivate them to cooperate further (cf. Stolle, 1998; Stolle 
and Hooghe, 2004; Stolle and Harell, 2013).  
 Individual social capital also provides an individual with access to resources owned by people 
in her personal social network that, in turn, will facilitate collaboration (van der Gaag and Snijders, 2004). 
Generally speaking, neo-Tocquevillean approaches are based on the presumption that recurring social 
contacts and rational evaluations of available opportunities result in support for collective arrangements. 
Individual social capital decreases transaction costs of being involved in common affairs because, in 
trustful relationships, fewer resources are required to guarantee compliance than in other contacts 
(Ripperger, 1998, pp. 26, 181). A more critical approach, stressing the fact that individuals with high 
levels of individual social capital simply can afford to enter potentially risky arrangements (Newton, 
2001) results in the same expectation.  
Applied to democratic citizenship this line of reasoning implies that citizens with relatively high 
levels of individual social capital will hence be more willing to “make democracy work” than people 
confronted with higher opportunity costs in their direct social environment, because recurring contacts 
improve their social skills, stimulate democratic virtues and provide access to other resources. As Paxton 
(2002, p. 257) explains these networks are especially important for the transition to democracy (providing 
spaces of critical discourses and active opposition citizenship) as well as for the persistence of democracy 
(citizens do not remain isolated but are integrated in associations). Our first hypothesis, then, deals with 
the expected consequences of individual social capital for democratic citizenship: 
 
H1: Citizens with relatively high levels of individual social capital will show relatively high levels of 
democratic citizenship. 
 
Collective Social Capital  
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In contrast to individual social capital, collective social capital is a collective good – that is, an “important 
resource available to societies and communities” (Hooghe and Stolle, 2003, p. 1). The expected influence 
is based primarily on the fact that the advantages of collective social capital are available to all citizens 
embedded in the same context. This influence has been identified as the “rainmaker effect” (Putnam et 
al., 2000) or more generally as a “spill-over effect” (Uslaner 2002, Ch. 5).  
 Here, two mechanisms can be discerned. First, in environments rich on collective social capital 
individuals can rely on the fact that they live in a context where democracy actually “works” well. 
Societies with a dense and active civil society offer relatively easy access to generally widespread trustful 
relationships in the realm of politics and in all kinds of networks, lowering the opportunity costs for 
engagement and compliant behavior for all citizens in this society. In such contexts, involvement implies 
lower costs – and especially lower risks –, and higher benefits than in societies that provide less collective 
social capital. Stressing a lack of social capital Hooghe and Zmerli remark: “… the underlying logic seems 
to be that if citizens feel the authorities can no longer be trusted, there is less reason to comply with social 
norms” (2011, p. 2). Because fewer resources are required to guarantee compliance, collective social 
capital decreases the transaction costs of cooperation and collective action for everybody and not only for 
people involved in networks (van Deth, 2001; Jordana, 1999). Applied to democratic citizenship, a 
reduction of transaction costs implies that support for democratic virtues and the willingness to be socially 
and politically active will be more likely. 
A second mechanism relating collective social capital to democratic citizenship is based on social 
pressures to obtain compliance and conformity (cf. Feldman, 1985). Whereas individuals living in an 
environment with a high level of collective social capital will be tempted to accept collaboration and trust 
as desirable or normal, people confronted with less collective social capital will conclude the opposite. 
Again this holds for all citizens; that is, people in general will be more likely to respect norms and 
obligations of community life in contexts relatively rich on collective social capital (Letki, 2006, p. 308). 
Specifically, in societies with high levels of collective social capital, being interested in politics or casting 
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a vote is considered to be a norm that should be followed. This willingness to consent is not based on “… 
one’s self-interest”, but on “… a feeling of obligation or responsibility that leads to self-regulatory 
behavior” (van Deth, 2001, p. 9). On the basis of the two mechanisms we expect: 
 
H2: The higher the level of collective social capital in a society, the higher the level of democratic 
citizenship is. 
 
Individual and Collective Social Capital Combined  
The two modes of social capital can also have combined (multiplicative) effects, which mean that one 
mode of social capital conditions the effect of the other type. Although collective social capital facilitates 
democratic citizenship of all people in a given society, it probably will affect those who already have 
individual social capital stronger than people with lower levels of individual social capital. Because 
individual social capital can be more easily and more effectively transformed into democratic citizenship 
under more supportive conditions, the expected benefits of investing individual social capital are higher 
in capital rich societies than in less fortunate environments. Under unsupportive conditions the benefits 
are insecure and probably relatively low. Referring to Levi Letki (2006) specifies a mechanism of “ethical 
reciprocity,” which in general means that people are willing to follow their existing internal norms as long 
as everyone else is also contributing: “Ethical reciprocity rests on a desire to behave fairly and is 
reinforced by evidence that others are doing their part” (Letki, 2006, p. 25). Therefore, if a person having 
a certain amount of individual social capital observes that other people in a given community contribute 
as well, she will be more likely to collaborate and to contribute to the production of collective goods. 
Collective social capital, therefore, positively conditions the effect of individual social capital (for similar 
argument on “cross fertilization”, see Welzel, 2013). On this basis, we expect that:  
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H3: The impact of individual social capital on the level of democratic citizenship is stronger if the 
level of collective social capital is higher. 
 
Operationalization, Data and Methods  
For empirical tests of our hypotheses information about individual citizens and their specific contexts is 
required. Individual data come from the ISSP (2004) ‘citizenship module’, which, unlike other 
comparative surveys, has measures for individual social capital (mainly a battery on voluntary 
associations) as well as a wide range of aspects of democratic citizenship, and covers a large number of 
western style liberal democracies (also outside Europe).2 There are data from 37,366 individuals living in 
28 democracies in North America, European Union member states, Norway, Switzerland, New Zealand, 
Australia, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and Israel. This data are supplemented by contextual indicators 
for collective social capital and other relevant features (see below).  
 
Individual Social Capital  
Individual social capital is measured by a composite indicator combining the two major aspects of social 
capital: involvement in voluntary associations and social trust. ISSP 2004 covers four types of voluntary 
associations – trade unions, church groups, sports and cultural groups, and other groups. Involvement in 
these organizations is measured on a four-point scale: active member, inactive member, former member, 
and non-member. Factor analysis (PCA) using polychoric inter-item correlations (as the data is ordinal 
level) performed on these four items in the pooled data set shows that the variables create one component 
(loadings for trade unions = .62, church groups = .60, sports and cultural groups = . 79, other groups= 
.79). The resulting additive index for “group membership” is based on the average score (Cronbach’s 
Alpha = .56). 
Social trust is measured as an index compiling answers to the statements “People can be generally 
trusted” and “How often will people try to cheat on you?”. Responses range from 1 to 4 with higher values 
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indicating more trust. The resulting index for “social trust” is based on the average score (Spearman rho 
= .39, Cronbach’s Alpha = .53). 
Since social capital is theorized to be a single concept composed of civic involvement and social 
trust that are “tangled as well-tossed spaghetti” (Putnam, 2000, p. 137) we create a composite measure of 
individual social capital (average of added scores). While the two variables are modestly related (Pearson 
r = .22, Cronbach’s Alpha = .36), all analyses were rerun with the two variables entered separately as a 
robustness check. The results do not reveal any substantial differences with the results obtained with the 
composite measure. For theoretical reasons the main analyses uses the composite measure because social 
capital is neither only networks nor only social trust, but a combination of both.   
 
 
Collective Social Capital  
Following the conceptualization of political culture as the distribution of attitudes in a political system 
(Almond and Verba, 1963), we measure collective social capital as a so-called analytical contextual 
property by aggregating features of individual citizens of a particular country (Lazarsfeld and Menzel, 
1962). Collective social capital is measured with the distributions of social trust and associational 
membership in a particular society (Letki, 2006; Whiteley et al., 2010). These aggregated measures 
correspond closely to Putnam’s idea of social capital as a bottom-up phenomenon originating in everyday 
routine practices of ordinary citizens (Putnam, 1993; Tarrow, 1996). Other conceptualizations of 
collective social capital focusing on global instead of aggregated features – such as data on civil society 
or corruption levels (van Deth, 2003) – do not capture this aspect of collective social capital and rather 
refer to the functioning of institutions. 
 National contexts probably are the most relevant environments for the impact of collective social 
capital. Although several authors opt for the local or regional level (Letki, 2006; Beugelsdijk and van 
Schaik, 2005; Freitag and Kirchner, 2011), especially political, economic, and institutional arrangements 
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are mainly defined at the national level. Even in an increasingly globalized world, the national state 
remains the main point of orientation for most citizens (Levi, 2008). Moreover, there is much larger 
variation across countries in collective social capital than there is across regions within countries.3 Since 
collective social capital is considered to condition the impact of individual social capital (see Hypotheses 
3), the first is measured temporally before the second. To measure collective social capital we use the 
European and World Value Surveys Integrated Data File 1999-2002. This assures that collective social 
capital is measured two to five years earlier than individual social capital.4  
 To measure the level of collective social capital in a country the percentage of people in that 
country who are member in at least one voluntary association is used for the structural aspects, and the 
percentage of people who trust others for the cultural aspects (see Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Letki, 
2006). Just as with the measures for the two aspects of individual social capital the scores on the two 
variables are averaged.5 The resulting measure for the level of collective social capital indicates the 
relative share of people with social capital in a given country (Pearson r = .73, Cronbach’s Alpha = .80).  
All analyses were rerun with the two measures for different aspects of collective social capital 
entered into the models separately to check whether the results are driven by one of the aspects only. The 
findings are substantively the same as for the composite measure showed here. Furthermore, all analyses 
run with indicators for collective social capital constructed from the individual-level indicator of social 
capital from the ISSP data show essentially the same results (only the effects are stronger). 
 
Democratic Citizenship 
Following the already mentioned approach of Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry (1996), who conceptualize two 
dimensions of democratic citizenship – political evaluations and political behaviour – we use four major 
indicators covering these dimensions that are available in the ISSP 2004: political satisfaction for the 
evaluative/normative dimension, and voting, non-electoral participation and opinion leadership for the 
engagement dimension. The various measures are constructed in the following ways: 
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- Political satisfaction is measured with the average of an additive index of three items assessing 
agreement with the statements “politicians can be trusted” and “people are in politics only because 
of personal profit” (the response categories for both questions range from 1 to 5, and higher values 
indicate higher levels of trust) and satisfaction with democracy in a particular country (the 
responses measured on a ten-point scale). Factor analysis (PCA) of the pooled data extracts a 
single factor (loading for trust into politicians = .75, politicians personal profit = .77, satisfaction 
with democracy = .75). The final measure was rescaled to range from zero to one (Cronbach’s 
Alpha = .62). The Intra-class Correlation Coefficient (ICC; see Snijders and Bosker, 2012), which 
indicates the amount of variation that can be attributed to potential contextual effects among the 
28 democracies, is 21 percent. 
- Voting is indicated by the question on turnout in the last national parliamentary election: one 
means that the person took part at the elections, zero means all other responses (ICC =14%). 
- Non-electoral participation is indicated by a summated rating index for participation in six political 
activities in the last twelve months: signing a petition; taking part in a demonstration, attending a 
political meeting or rally; contacting a politician or a civil servant to express one’s views; donating 
money or raising funds for a social or political activity; boycotted or deliberately bought certain 
products for political, ethical or environmental reasons; contacting or appearing in the media to 
express one’s views. Factor analysis (PCA) using tetra-choric inter-item correlations (as the data 
is nominal level) of the pooled data extracts a single factor (loadings for signing a petition = .72, 
demonstrating = .72, attending a meeting = .80, contacting a politician = .76, donating money = 
.68, boycotted certain products = .68, contacting media = .74). The individual scores are averaged 
and the index was then rescaled to range from zero to one (Cronbach’s Alpha = .64; ICC = 14%).  
- Political opinion leadership is measured by the questions on the frequency of political discussion 
with others, and attempts to convince others of one’s political opinion. These two variables are 
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measured on a four-point scale. The individual scores were averaged and the index was then 
rescaled to range from zero to one (Spearman rho = .56; Cronbach’s Alpha = .72; ICC = 6%).6  
 
Controls 
At the individual level, standard socio-demographic factors are used as controls. Age is measured as a 
continuous variable. Education is indicated by years of schooling completed. Income is measured as 
family income. Sex is coded as zero for males and one for females. Additionally three attitudinal controls 
are included that are considered main determinants of political attitudes and especially behavior. 
Subjective political interest is measured with a straightforward question “how much are you interested in 
politics” with four response categories offered. The last two controls cover the level of political efficacy. 
External efficacy is measured with an additive index (from one to five) of two items assessing agreement 
with the statements “no influence on what government does” and “government does not care what I think” 
(Cronbach’s Alpha = .70). Internal efficacy is measured with an additive index (from 1 to 5) of two items 
assessing agreement with the statements “good understanding of politics” and “most people better 
informed than I am” (Cronbach’s Alpha = .45). Political satisfaction is in included in all models as a 
control (except, of course, in models that include this variable as a dependent variable).  
At the country level we control for economic development and the democratic history in all 
models. The level of economic development is measured as a country’s GPD per capita (PPP US$) in 
2003.7 Democratic history is measured by the number of years the country has been democratic as of 
2003.8 Furthermore, several controls relevant for particular dependent variables are included, such as the 
electoral system for voting (reference category = majoritarian, 1 = proportional, and 2 = mixed system) 
and indicators for the political opportunity structure (POLCON V measure, see Henizs, 2002) for non-
electoral participation.  
 
Analyses 
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As the data reflect a multilevel structure, where individuals at the first level are nested in countries 
representing the second level, multi-level modeling is employed. Specifically, we use linear multilevel 
regression to analyze the numeric dependent variables. As in standard linear regression models the 
coefficients can be interpreted as estimates for the unit change in the dependent variable for one unit 
change in the independent variable.  Since voting is a binary variable, we use multilevel logistic regression 
in this case. The fixed effects represent unstandardized regression coefficients on the logit scale. 9 
Following a strategy proposed by van der Meer and colleagues (2010) influential country cases are 
included as dummy variables in the final model estimates. Since the number of influential cases is 
relatively high in some computations, we present the final results for models with the lowest number of 
influential cases that show the same results as models with all influential cases included.  
 
The Empirical Consequences of Social Capital 
Table 1 summarizes the main results of the analyses (full Tables can be obtained from the first author). 
Models I show the results for individual social capital plus controls (hypotheses H1) and Models II for 
collective social capital plus controls (H2). Models III present the results for the combined impact of 
individual and collective social capital. Finally, Models IV show the results for the interaction effects of 
individual and collective social capital (H3).  
The results in the first rows for Models I in the upper and lower parts of Table 1 confirm that 
individual social capital has a significant positive effect on democratic citizenship; that is, on all variables 
under study. H1, then, is corroborated by the empirical findings. These results support neo-Tocquevillean 
theoretical interpretations based on individual-level mechanisms, which argue that people possessing 
higher level of social capital will be relatively strongly satisfied with politics and be more engaged in 
politics. Although this is a classical expectation of social capital theory, not all studies have found support 
for these effects (cf. Norris, 2002; Armingeon, 2007). 
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- Table 1 – 
 
The second rows for Models II in Table 1 show the results for the effects of collective social capital 
without taking into account individual social capital. With one exception all coefficients are significant 
and positive, thereby supporting H2 even when other contextual factors such as economic development 
and political institutions are taken into account. In line with our hypothesis, people living in national 
contexts richer in collective social capital show relatively high levels of political satisfaction and political 
opinion leadership, and are also more likely to vote than people living in countries with less collective 
social capital. A remarkable exception here is non-electoral political participation: collective social capital 
apparently does not affect individual participation in non-electoral politics. This finding is in line with 
results from other studies that explain similar findings with the consensual and cooperative character of 
social capital rich societies, that might facilitate other outcomes (as supported by other results of this 
study) but not non-electoral participation for which a competitive political environment is much more 
important (Vráblíková, 2014). A competitive political environment provides chances for opposing 
interests, which usually is an indispensable condition for non-electoral participation.  
Models III in Table 1 test whether the effects of collective social capital are actually independent 
of contextual effects or can be reduced to the effects of individual-level social capital. The general finding 
is that the effects displayed in Models I and Models II remain more or less the same – both individual and 
collective social capital have significant and positive effects on all of the dependent variables (the only 
exception is, again, non-electoral participation). These results show that the effect of collective social 
capital is not mediated by individual social capital. Collective social capital increases political satisfaction, 
opinion leadership, and voting beyond the effect of individual social capital  (and beyond the effect of 
other contextual factors such as economic development or political institutions). This finding, again, 
corroborates our first two hypotheses.10 
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To illustrate the size of the effects of individual and collective social capital, we calculated 
differences in the predicted values of the dependent variables when the minimal and maximal value of the 
two measures of social capital are compared while keeping all other variables at their mean values. A 
change from the lowest level of individual social capital to the highest level reveals an increase in political 
satisfaction of 20 percent, in voting of 21 percent, in non-electoral participation of 28 percent, and in 
opinion leadership of 14 percent on the scales of the dependent variables while keeping all other variables 
at their means. The same comparison in the case of collective social capital, i.e. comparing the outcome 
between the country with the highest level of collective social capital in our data set (Sweden) with the 
country with the lowest level (Portugal) and all else equal, increases political satisfaction by 9 percent, 
voting by 11 percent, and opinion leadership by 8 percent. Though the effects of collective social capital 
only reach halve the strength of the effects of individual social capital, collective social capital still has a 
notable effect on the dependent variables under study.  
Do levels of individual and collective social capital show interaction effects on democratic 
citizenship? The interaction hypothesis (H3) states that the effects of individual social capital on 
democratic citizenship are especially stimulated by an environment rich of collective social capital. 
Models IV corroborate this expectation only for non-electoral participation and voting.11 The effects of 
individual social capital on these two modes of political participation, indeed are significantly stronger 
the higher the level of collective social capital is. The combined effect of individual and social capital on 
political opinion leadership and satisfaction with politics is not significant, which implies that individual 
social capital affects these indicators irrespective of the level of collective social capital.  
Figure 1 explores the conditional effects of social capital on voting and non-electoral 
participation into more detail. For the sake of an accessible presentation the level of individual social 
capital is categorized into three equal groups representing people with low, middle and high levels of 
individual social capital.12 The figure shows that particularly lines representing groups with high levels 
of individual social capital have a much steeper positive slope than the other two categories. This 
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interaction pattern is strongest for non-electoral participation. While collective social capital does not 
matter at all for non-electoral participation of people with the lowest level of individual social capital (as 
the effect of low levels of individual social capital does not change with collective social capital), it 
increases non-electoral participation of people who already possess higher levels of individual social 
capital. A similar interaction pattern is shown for voting. Evidently, collective social capital boosts the 
likelihood of voting very substantially among people with a high level of individual social capital. In 
contrast to non-electoral participation, collective social capital has a relatively large direct effect on voting 
as also the categories of middle and low of individual social capital show a positive slope.  
 
- Figure 1 – 
 
The fact that the combined effects of individual and collective social capital are different across 
various indicators of democratic citizenship suggests that no single or common mechanism accounts for 
all aspects of democratic citizenship alike. Why is the interaction significantly positive only for two 
indicators of democratic citizenship? A possible explanation is that for people to get involved in politics 
in general, mobilization (usually taking place through personal involvement in social networks and with 
socially trustworthy people) is a necessary condition to become active. As the case of non-electoral 
participation shows, the effect of the external environment (collective social capital) is fully dependent 
on this condition. This might suggest that a high level of collective social capital boosts mobilization and 
recruitment into participation through individual social capital rather than by decreasing transaction costs 
of transforming individual social capital into various kinds of democratic citizenship.  
 
Conclusions and Discussion 
The main argument presented here is that a conceptual distinction between different modes of social 
capital – individual vs. collective – should be taken seriously and examined empirically. We showed that 
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individual and collective social capital both have independent positive effects on democratic citizenship: 
political satisfaction, voting, political opinion leadership (but not on non-electoral participation). Besides, 
in the case of voting and non-electoral participation individual and collective social capital also positively 
interact with each other. These findings show that social capital promotes democratic citizenship not only 
as an individual resource but in addition also as a collective good that benefits everybody residing in 
contexts rich on social capital. Especially the finding on the contextual effects of collective social capital 
is important as it supports the core idea that social capital is a valuable societal resource.  
 Some normative implications of these findings are evident. Although general improvements of the 
levels of both types of social capital can be expected to have positive effects on democratic citizenship, 
those who are already privileged in terms of individual social capital will profit most from a social capital 
rich environment. Since this combined effects will be relatively strong for countries already rich on social 
capital the most likely result will be an increasing gap between individuals with high and low levels of 
social capital. This seems to be another variant of the ‘Matthew Effect’: those who have more will get 
more, and those who have less will get slightly more but will remain in a relatively deprived position. 
This means that, although collective social capital strengthens democratic citizenship of all citizens, it 
reproduces and increases the gap in democratic participation among citizens. In contexts rich on collective 
social capital, those who already control a high level of individual social capital “make democracy work” 
to a much greater extent than those who lack that mode of capital. Hence higher individual and collective 
social capital has also its dark-side as it reproduces and increases inequality in democratic participation. 
Distinctions between individual and collective modes of social capital, therefore, are not only relevant for 
scholarly discussions about the empirical validity of various approaches to the prerequisites of vibrant 
democracies. Much more importantly, only this differentiation allows us to detect ‘Matthew Effects’ 
which lead directly to the question of (un)equal participatory opportunities for citizens in democratic 
societies.  
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Table 1: Social Capital and Democratic Citizenship   
 
 
Political Satisfaction Voting Non-electoral Participation Political Opinion Leadership 
Social Capital M I M II M III M IV M I M II M III M IV M I M II M III M IV M I M II M III M IV 
Individual 
 
.067 
(.01) 
***  .066 
(.02) 
*** .069 
(.05) 
*** .608 
(.05) 
***   .605 
(.05) 
*** .626 
(.06) 
*** .093 
(.01) 
***  .093 
(.01) 
*** .089      
(.01) 
*** .046 
(.01) 
***   .046 
(.01) 
*** .044 
(.01) 
*** 
Collective   .002 
(.01) 
*** .002 
(.01) 
** .001 
(.01) 
**   .019 
(.07) 
** .016 
(.07) 
* .015 
(.07) 
*  .001 
(.01) 
-.001 
(.01) 
.001 
(.01) 
 .001 
(.01) 
** .001 
(.01) 
* .001 
(.01) 
 ** 
Individual* Collective    .001 
(.01) 
       .012 
(.03) 
***    .001 
(.01) 
***      -.001 
(.01) 
  
Random effects                                 
ICC % 21       14        14       6       
Individual level .004 *** .002 *** .001 *** .001 ***       1  1  1  1   .002 *** .001 *** .001 *** .001 *** .002 *** .001 *** .001 *** .001 *** 
Collective level .024 *** .025 *** .024 *** .024 ***  .487 *** .150 *** .152 *** .161 ***  .027 *** .028 *** .027 *** .027 *** .044 *** .044 *** .044 *** .044 *** 
% expl. individual level 18  16 18 19  24  23  25  32  17  12  17     19  33  32  33  33  
% expl. collective level 52  81 85 86  12  73  73  71  57  84  86     78  55  70  71  69  
% expl total  25  30 32 33  22  30  31  32  22  22  26     26  34  34  35  35  
% expl. individual level social 
capital 
    9        74        29       0  
Intercept  
.468 
(.01) 
*** .471 
(.01) 
*** .470 
(.01) 
*** .468 
(.01) 
*** 1.68 
(.14) 
*** 1.91 
(.31) 
*** 1.92 
(.31) 
*** 1.91 
(.32) 
*** .121 
(.01) 
*** .115 
(.01) 
*** .114 
(.01) 
*** .111 
(.01) 
*** .454 
(.01) 
*** .457 
(.01) 
*** .456 
(.01) 
*** .456 
(.01) 
*** 
Log Likelihood 10,185 9,845 10,201 10,238 -8,457 -8,518 -8,441 -8,430 8,283 7,743 8,298 8,397 3,269 3,184 3,275 3,283 
BIC -20,260 -19,468 -20,241 -20,285 17,023 17,226 17,082 17,089 -16,447 -15,316 -16,417 -16,584 -6,418 -6,198 -6,370 -6,357 
Individual level N 22,921 22,921 22,921 22,921 21,847 21,847 21,847 21,847 21,448 21,448 21,448 21,448 22,767 22,767 22,767 22,767 
Collective level N 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 
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Unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses are displayed of multi-level linear regressions (multi-level logit regressions 
for voting). Controls included: gender, age, income, years of schooling, internal and external efficacy, political interest, political trust, satisfaction 
with democracy, GDP per Capita (PPP), democratic history, electoral system, effective number of political parties, political opportunities, and 
influential country cases. Continuous factors entered as grand-centered.  
Level of significance:  * p≤.05, ** p≤.01, *** p≤.001. 
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Figure 1: Voting and Non-electoral Participation by Individual and Collective Social Capital 
 
 
Note: The figure displays predicted voting and non-electoral participation and 90 per cent confidence 
intervals for three groups of individual social capital by the level of collective social capital.  
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1 Obviously, distinct characterizations of social capital can also be based on the presumed directions of 
potential effects (bonding vs bridging, positive vs. negative, connected vs. isolated, good vs bad forms). 
Since our interest here is on the impact of different modes of social capital we do not distinguish between 
specific forms. 
2 Data and questionnaire of the ISSP 2004 study are available at: 
http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp?object=http://zacat.gesis.org/obj/fStudy/ZA3950. 
3 For instance, analysis based on data on social capital used by Freitag and Kirchner (2011) from 134 
regions in 14 European countries shows that 83 per cent of the variation exists across countries and only 
17 per cent can be found across regions. 
4 Data and questionnaire of the third wave of the WVS are available at: 
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs/articles/folder_published/survey_2000. 
5 Other studies of the contextual effects of political culture (e.g. Welzel, 2013; Welzel and Deutsch, 
2012) use a national average of the individual-level composite measure of cultural values. However, the 
collective aspect of social capital consists in its spread across the country, rather than in the country’s 
central tendency that does not need to indicate the level of prevalence of such culture among the public. 
Moreover, social capital does not have a single-peak distribution clustered around the mean (see Welzel 
and Deutsch, 2012). The analyses run with the country averages of the individual-level indicator of social 
capital from the ISSP citizenship data show substantively the same results as presented in this study.  
6  Obviously, these four indicators of democratic citizenship are positively but modestly correlated 
(bivariate correlations are for most combinations are lower than .17), which indicates that the indicators 
selected are not redundant but cover different aspects of democratic citizenship. Although political 
opinion leadership and non-electoral participation correlate stronger (r = .33), we keep them as separate 
concepts because other literature has emphasized differences between them and, more importantly, 
because our study also shows different effects of collective social capital on the two outcomes.  
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7 Data are obtained from the International Monetary Fund available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/02/weodata/index.aspx. 
8 Data are obtained from the ‘Democracy Timeseries Data’ available at: 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Data/Data.htm. 
9 As in other nonlinear probability models the variance of the residual variance at the individual level 
is fixed at a constant. The residual variance at the individual level signifies a scale factor 1 (i.e. that the 
model is assumed to hold precisely), which in case of a binomial distribution translates into π²/3 = 3.29 
(Hox, 2002, Ch. 6). 
10 The likelihood-ratio tests comparing the log-likelihood of the models show that, with the exception 
of Model I for political opinion leadership, Models III are significantly better than Models I and II. 
Specifically, the statistics testing Models I nested in Models III are for political satisfaction 31.60***, for 
voting 31.11***, for non-electoral participation 29.87***, and for political opinion leadership 0.0617. 
The statistics testing Models II nested in Models III are for political satisfaction 712.77***, for voting 
154.40***, for non-electoral participation 1110.80***, and for political opinion leadership 182.27***. 
11  The likelihood-ratio tests comparing the log-likelihood of the models show that Models IV are 
significantly better than Models I, II and III. Specifically, the statistics testing Models I nested in Models 
IV are for political satisfaction 104.69***, for voting 53.80***, for non-electoral participation 226.82***, 
and for political opinion leadership 28.57***. The statistics testing Models II nested in Models IV are for 
political satisfaction 785.86***, for voting 177.09***, for non-electoral participation 1307.75***, and 
for political opinion leadership 198.83***. The statistics testing Models III nested in Models IV are for 
political satisfaction 73.09***, for voting 22.69***, for non-electoral participation 196.95***, and for 
political opinion leadership 16.56***. 
12 Figure 1 is hence constructed on the basis of a different model than Model IV presented in Table 1. 
Model IV includes both individual and collective social capital as quantitative variables, which cannot be 
graphed as predicted values (only marginal effects can be graphed; figures of all marginal effects can be 
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obtained from the first author). From this reason, a modified model using individual social capital as a 
categorical variable was run (not displayed) and used to create Figure 1.   
 
 
 
 
